



When will computational epidemiologists be replaced by AI?



Planes, trains and autodidacts







COMPLEXITY

THE
EMERGING
SCIENCE
AT
THE
EDGE
OF
ORDER
AND
CHAOS

"One comes away from *Complexity* both intellectually excited by the ideas and emotionally involved with the people struggling to formulate them. This is a deep tale of science in the making"
— Douglas R. Hofstadter, author of *Gödel, Escher, Bach*

M. MITCHELL WALDROP






Doyne Farmer



Sam Bowles



Alan Perelson




Bette Korber

HIV-1 Dynamics in Vivo: Virion Clearance Rate, Infected Cell Life-Span, and Viral Generation Time

Alan S. Perelson, Avidan U. Neumann, Martin Markowitz,
John M. Leonard, David D. Ho*

A new mathematical model was used to analyze a detailed set of human immunodeficiency virus-type 1 (HIV-1) viral load data collected from five infected individuals after the administration of a potent inhibitor of HIV-1 protease. Productively infected cells were estimated to have, on average, a life-span of 2.2 days (half-life $t_{1/2} = 1.6$ days), and plasma virions were estimated to have a mean life-span of 0.3 days ($t_{1/2} = 0.24$ days). The estimated average total HIV-1 production was 10.3×10^9 virions per day, which is substantially greater than previous minimum estimates. The results also suggest that the

Natural History of HIV Infection



Try math epidemiology!

Barrier to entry low (no PhD, unlike econ)

Potential for major impact

Reusable physics skills!




From enthusiasm to emergency

ST MARY'S HOSPITAL



Lord Robert May & Sir Roy Anderson



review

Populatio

Roy M. Anderson
Zoology Department and C

Robert M. May
Biology Department, Prince

If the host population is assumed to be at equilibrium, a wider part of a two-part model can be used to describe the second part of the indirectly transmitted

ANY contemporary ecological model devoted to predator-prey interactions embraces field and laboratory data, mathematical models, and the study of prey and predator population dynamics.

In natural communities, evidence suggests that viruses, bacteria, protozoa, and fungi are likely to play a part analogous to that of predators or resources in plant and animal populations. Park's¹ experiments in which the density of *Tribolium castaneum* was drastically reduced by the introduction of the parasitic wasp *Hydrometra myra* demonstrated the importance of infectious diseases in the regulation of wild mammal populations. Such a factor in bird populations was suggested by sheep in North America infected by the lungworm which then predisposed them to pneumonia.^{2,3} On a grand scale,

Epidemiological patterns

Roy M. Anderson

* Parasite Epidemiology
† Biology Department

Epidemiological data are accumulating, but

It is now seven years since the first case of the syndrome (type 1), was discovered at the National Institute of Health throughout the world. Cases reported between 1981 and 1983 in 133 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, concerning both in the likely demographic distribution and why heterogeneity in the developing countries.

The potential for the spread of AIDS consequently AIDS magnitude of the epidemic that group⁴⁻⁸. R_0 is produced, on average, stages of the epidemic. As such, it depends on the duration of individual infection, the rate of new infections acquired (category), times the βcD . Setting aside the 'average' sufficient to assign components. In this such assignments, it is tainties that are encountered which we believe can tell.

Incubation and

Most epidemiological models assume a uniform level of infection. The incubation period, onset of AIDS⁹⁻¹¹. In the case of the main cases and cohort studies, seroconversion is a function of the incubation period associated with infection, or indeed recent analysis¹² of the diagnosis of AIDS incubation periods older than 12 yr (but not intervals when after infection, $p(r) = \exp(-ar^c)$ and a and c are constants). In



Epidemiology

Roy M. Anderson
Steve

¹ Department of

² 21 Sasson

This paper presents a new aetiological model for the spread of the disease, with the aim of making simple in the case of the disease, further understanding of the disease presented in

The re-emergence of the viral aetiological agent of SARS in China at the end of 2003 (Paterson 2004), following the epidemic earlier in the year affecting many countries, rang alarm bells in the WHO and elsewhere. Thankfully,

The NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL of MEDICINE

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa — The First 9 Months of the Epidemic and Forward Projections

WHO Ebola Response Team*

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND

On March 23, 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) was notified of an outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Guinea. On August 8, the WHO declared the epidemic to be a "public health emergency of international concern."

METHODS

By September 14, 2014, a total of 4507 probable and confirmed cases, including 2296 deaths from EVD (Zaire species) had been reported from five countries in West Africa — Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. We analyzed a detailed subset of data on 3343 confirmed and 667 probable Ebola cases collected in Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone as of September 14.

devastation earlier in 2003. A clear priority is further surveillance of animals in settings where the human virus spread extensively so as to better understand the origins of the epidemic in humans and the role of animal reservoirs.

TABLE 1. Summary of the epidemic in West Africa, 2014

Male homosexual

0.60

35

48

Host population



The simple SIR epidemic model

S

Susceptible

I

Infected

R

Recovered


The simple SIR epidemic model




λ = force of infection

d = duration of infectiousness


SIR




SIS




SEIR



SEIS





2009: H1N1 influenza pandemic





Influenza (Flu)

Avian Influenza

Bird Flu Basics +

Current Situation

Specific Avian Flu Viruses -

Asian Avian Influenza A (H5N1) +

Asian Lineage Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus -

Additional Information

H7N9 Images

Publications & Resources

North American Lineage AI Viruses

Past Outbreaks +

Avian Influenza > Specific Avian Flu Viruses

Asian Lineage Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus




Language: English (US) ▾

Background

Human infections with an Asian lineage avian influenza A (H7N9) virus ("Asian H7N9") were first reported in China in March 2013. Annual epidemics of sporadic human infections with Asian H7N9 viruses in China have been reported since that time. China is currently experiencing its 5th epidemic of Asian H7N9 human infections. This is the largest annual epidemic to date. [As of September 13, 2017, the World Health Organization \(WHO\) has reported 764 human infections with Asian H7N9 virus during the 5th epidemic](#) ¹, making the largest epidemic to date. This brings the total cumulative number of human infections with Asian lineage H7N9 reported by WHO to 1562. Additional infections have been reported, but not yet publically announced by WHO. During epidemics one through four, about 40 percent of people confirmed with Asian H7N9 virus infection died.

Asian H7N9 Outbreak Characterization



- Asian H7N9 virus infections in poultry in China
- Sporadic infections in people; most with poultry exposure




Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)



Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) is viral respiratory illness that was recently recognized in humans. It was first reported in Saudi Arabia in 2012 and has since spread to several other countries, including the United States. Most people identified as infected with MERS-CoV developed severe acute respiratory illness, including fever, cough, and shortness of breath. Many of them have died.

[More >](#)



ABOUT MERS

Information about MERS including symptoms and complications, how it spreads, prevention and treatment...

PEOPLE WHO MAY BE AT INCREASED RISK FOR MERS

Information for travelers from the Arabian Peninsula, contacts of ill travelers from this area, contacts of a confirmed case of MERS, healthcare personnel not using infection-control precautions, and people with exposure to camels...

Countries with Lab-Confirmed MERS Cases

Countries in or near the Arabian Peninsula with MERS cases: Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen.

Infectious Disease Modeling Methods as Tools for Informing Response to Novel Influenza Viruses of Unknown Pandemic Potential

Manoj Gambhir,^{1,2,3,4} Catherine Bozio,^{4,5} Justin J. O'Hagan,^{2,3,4} Amra Uricanin,⁵ Lucinda E. Johnson,⁴ Matthew Biggerstaff,⁴ and David L. Swerdlow¹

¹Epidemiological Modelling Unit, Department of Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia; ²Modeling Unit, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); ³HRC Inc; ⁴Graduate Program in Epidemiology and Molecules to Mankind, Laney Graduate School, Emory University; ⁵Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases; ⁶Influenza Division; and ⁷Modeling Unit and Office of the Director, NCIRD, CDC, Atlanta, Georgia

The rising importance of infectious disease modeling makes this an appropriate time for a guide for public health practitioners tasked with preparing for, and responding to, an influenza pandemic. We list several questions that public health practitioners commonly ask about pandemic influenza and match these with analytical methods, giving details on when during a pandemic the methods can be used, how long it might take to implement them, and what data are required. Although software to perform these tasks is available, care needs to be taken to understand: (1) the type of data needed, (2) the implementation of the methods, and (3) the interpretation of results in terms of model uncertainty and sensitivity. Public health leaders can use this article to evaluate the modeling literature, determine which methods can provide appropriate evidence for decision-making, and to help them request modeling work from in-house teams or academic groups.

The 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic was one of the most closely tracked and studied epidemics in history. Traditional epidemiological methods, such as outbreak investigations and laboratory-based surveillance, were rapidly used to inform policy decisions [1–4]. These methods were enhanced by newer computational techniques such as bioinformatics and digital surveillance methods [5]. Simultaneously, substantial contributions

During an outbreak of influenza with pandemic potential, public health leaders ask a range of questions to inform situational awareness, help assess severity [11] and guide decisions that aim to control the spread and impact of disease. Critical questions include:

- What is the case-fatality ratio?
- What is the case-hospitalization ratio?

Table 1. Key Questions Related to Pandemic Preparedness and Response That Infectious Disease Modeling Methods Address

Questions	Pandemic Stage			Method			
	P	E	L	Sim	Stat	Analysis Time Commitment	Method
Epidemiology							
What is the basic reproduction number (R_0) and the current value, or the time course, of the effective reproduction number (R_{eff})?		X	X		✓	<1 mo	Growth rate of case incidence curve
		X	X		✓	<1 mo	Infection tree reconstruction
		X	X		✓	<1 mo	Richards population growth model
		X			✓	<1 mo	Chain binomial model
		X	X		✓	<1 mo	Case renewal process
		X			✓	<1 mo	Influenza genetic sequence analysis
		X	X	✓		<1 mo	Age-structured SEIR model
		X	X		✓	<1 wk	Maximum likelihood estimation
		X		✓	✓	<1 mo	Coalescent analysis
		X		✓		<1 wk	Next generation matrix
What is the predicted peak number of cases and time? What is the predicted cumulative number of cases over the epidemic (ie, final attack rate)?		X		✓		<1 mo	Age-structured SEIR model
				✓	✓	<1 mo	Digital surveillance methods
What are the possible spatiotemporal patterns of spread of the infection?		X		✓		>>1 mo	Individual-based model
				✓		<1 mo	Metapopulation model
What was the likely sequence of spatiotemporal spread of infection since the outbreak began?		X			✓	<1 mo	Infection tree reconstruction & travel pattern modeling
What is the severity of the virus(es) (ie, case-hospitalization/death-rate) accounting for ascertainment biases (eg, more likely to detect severe cases)?		X	X	✓		>>1 mo	Individual-based model
					✓	<1 mo	Bayesian evidence synthesis
					✓	<1 wk	Incidence curve backcalculation

Table 2. Description of the Modeling Methods Listed in Table 1

Method	Description	Data Needed
Age-structured SEIR model	A compartmental model in which hosts are grouped into population compartments composed of their age-group and their infection status, eg, an SEIR model. These models can be deterministic or stochastic, and the transitions between infection states are governed by contact and recovery rates [10, 12].	Case incidence stratified by age, contact matrix by age, cross-sectional serosurveys, physician visit/hospitalization rates to calculate symptomatic proportion/disease reporting rate/proportion immune, severity of infection across risk groups, initial number of infected individuals (or date on which the first infected individual was introduced into the population).
Antigenic cartography	A method for quantifying and visualizing the antigenic evolution of the influenza virus according to antigenic distances [13].	Influenza virus genetic sequences, antigenic distances between subtypes (using eg, hemagglutination inhibition assay).
Antigenic distance	Antigenic distances of proposed vaccine strains from predicted dominant circulating strain(s) are correlated with prior years' vaccine effectiveness estimates [14].	Hemagglutination inhibition assay distances of potential circulating strain(s) and record of vaccine effectiveness from prior years with amino acid sequences of past vaccine strains and dominant seasonal strains
Bayesian evidence synthesis	Prior knowledge and distinct surveillance data sources are combined to estimate epidemiologic quantities (eg number infected, case-hospitalization rate) [9].	Repeated cross-sectional serosurveys, numbers and dates of onset of confirmed cases, symptomatic cases, hospitalizations, intensive care admissions, dates of severe outcomes.
Branching process analysis	Branching process theory is used to estimate the number of offspring of primary cases [15]. The generation time distribution between households and incidence of infection of households [16] is estimated.	Contact tracing data, surveillance datasets, R_0 population distribution (ie, the probability associated with an individual in the population generating R_0 secondary cases at the start of the epidemic).
Case renewal process	Initial cases are modeled as a renewal process, which is a generalization of the Poisson process in which the time between cases is random and arbitrary, but independent and identically distributed [8, 17].	Case incidence time series (infection/hospitalization/death).
Chain binomial model	Initial cases are modeled as a discrete time chain of infections from one individual to another with probability of infection, or escape from infection, calculated using the binomial probability distribution [18].	Case incidence time series (infection/hospitalization/death).
Coalescent analysis	A Bayesian phylogenetic "coalescent" model is fitted to genetic sequence data obtained from isolates sampled from the infected population [19]. Growth rates of the epidemic are	Influenza genetic sequences and sampling times.

Opinion piece



Cite this article: Cori A *et al.* 2017 Key data for outbreak evaluation: building on the Ebola experience. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* **372**: 20160371.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2016.0371>

Accepted: 11 November 2016

One contribution of 17 to a theme issue 'The 2013–2016 West African Ebola epidemic: data, decision-making and disease control'.

Subject Areas:

health and disease and epidemiology

Key data for outbreak evaluation: building on the Ebola experience

Anne Cori^{1,†}, Christl A. Donnelly¹, Ilaria Dorigatti¹, Neil M. Ferguson¹, Christophe Fraser², Tini Garske¹, Thibaut Jombart¹, Gemma Nedjati-Gilani¹, Pierre Nouvellet¹, Steven Riley¹, Maria D. Van Kerkhove³, Harriet L. Mills^{1,4,5,†} and Isobel M. Blake^{1,†}


¹Medical Research Council Centre for Outbreak Analysis and Modelling, Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London W2 1PG, UK

²Oxford Big Data Institute, Li Ka Shing Centre for Health Information and Discovery, Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford OX3 7FZ, UK

³Centre for Global Health, Institut Pasteur, 25-28 Rue du Dr Roux, 75015 Paris, France


⁴MRC Integrative Epidemiology Unit, School of Social and Community Medicine, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 2BN, UK

⁵School of Veterinary Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol BS40 3DU, UK

 AC, 0000-0002-8443-9162; CAD, 0000-0002-0195-2463; TG, 0000-0002-8952-4710; GN-G, 0000-0001-5723-5028; IMB, 0000-0002-3977-1318

Following the detection of an infectious disease outbreak, rapid epidemiological assessment is critical for guiding an effective public health response. To understand the transmission dynamics and potential impact of an outbreak, several types of data are necessary. Here we build on experience gained in the West African Ebola epidemic and prior emerging infectious disease outbreaks to set out a checklist of data needed to: (1) quantify severity and transmissibility; (2) characterize heterogeneities in transmission and their determinants; and (3)

Schematic illustrating the data needed to answer questions at different stages of the epidemic to inform the response.



Infectious disease modelling using data from



Presanis^a, Paul J. Birrell^a, Gianpaolo Scalia Tomba^c,

Health, Robinson Way, Cambridge CB2 0SR, UK

W9 5HT, UK

ergata, Rome, Italy

k, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK

A B S T R A C T

Public health-related decision-making on policies aimed at controlling epidemics is increasingly evidence-based, exploiting multiple sources of data. Policy makers rely on complex models that are required to be robust, realistically approximating epidemics and consistent with all relevant data. Meeting these requirements in a statistically rigorous and defensible manner poses a number of challenging problems. How to weight evidence from different datasets and handle dependence between them, efficiently estimate and critically assess complex models are key challenges that we expound in this paper, using examples from influenza modelling.

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Mathematical models: A key tool for outbreak response

**Eric Lofgren^a, Caitlin M. Rivers^a, John M. Drake^c,
 Michael J. Smith^e, Alessandro Vespignani^f,
 David J. Nisbet^g, Marisa C. Eisenberg^g,
 David J. Nisbet^h, Kathleen A. Alexanderⁱ,
 James M. Hyman^j, Lauren A. Meyers^m,**

Department of Fish and Wildlife Conservation, ^aVirginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, VA 24061; ^bDepartment of Biostatistics, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195; ^cDepartment of Biology, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602; ^dFrancis I. Proctor Foundation, University of California, San Francisco, CA 94143; ^eDepartment of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, NY 10032; ^fDepartment of Mathematics, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115;

information. These models can clarify how the disease is spreading and provide timely guidance to policymakers. However, the use of models in public health often meets resistance (1), from doubts in peer review about the utility of such analyses to public skepticism that models can contribute when the means to control an epidemic are already known (2). Even when they are discussed in a positive light, models are often portrayed as arcane and largely inaccessible thought experiments (3). However, the role of models is crucial: they can be used to quantify the effect of mitigation efforts, provide guidance

TIME

WARNING:
WE ARE NOT READY FOR
THE NEXT PANDEMIC

SCIENCE KNOWS
HOW TO FIGHT
AN OUTBREAK—
BUT POLICY STILL
GETS IN THE WAY
BY BRYAN WALSH

HOW TO KEEP THE
WORLD SAFE
BY BILL GATES

However, this isn't working

At least not on a reasonable timescale

Math epi has been around for 5 decades but it's barely used in public health agencies, unless...

The sky is falling down

Ebola


Ebola outbreaks

To January 25th 2015

Number of people:

● infected
of whom:

● dead



Sources: WHO; UN; The Economist

*Declared Ebola-free †Excluding Congo



Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDC 24/7: Saving Lives. Protecting People.™

[CDC A-Z INDEX ▾](#)

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Ebola Virus Disease
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Ebola, Chikungunya & more

Language: English ▾



More ▾

Activations

- Ebola: 2014 West Africa Outbreak
- Polio Eradication

businesspulse



Public Health Matters Blog
Business Pulse: 2014-2015 Flu Season

Tweets

[Follow](#)



CDC Flu @CDCFlu
@tremoreau1 Flu activity often

15 Oct

CDC Emergency Response Activation Levels

1

Level 1

The highest level of response reserved for critical emergencies. CDC assigns the largest number of staff possible to work 24/7 on the response. To date, there have been three Level 1 responses: Ebola outbreak (2014), H1N1 influenza outbreak (2009) and Hurricane Katrina (2005).

2

Level 2

The CDC experts in the particular disease lead the response with a large number of other staff from the program area. A large number of staff from CDC's Emergency Operations Center may assist with the response.

3

Level 3

The CDC experts in the particular disease lead the response with some of their own staff. Some staff from CDC's Emergency Operations Center may assist in the response. CDC decides when a different level of response is needed.

CDC Emergency Response
When public health emergencies occur, CDC's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) manages the response. The EOC has three levels of response.



U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services
Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention

C1270629

CDC Emergency Response Activation Levels

A large, stylized orange number '1' with a white drop shadow, positioned to the left of the Level 1 description box.

Level 1

The highest level of response reserved for critical emergencies. CDC assigns the largest number of staff possible to work 24/7 on the response. To date, there have been three Level 1 responses: Ebola outbreak (2014), H1N1 influenza outbreak (2009) and Hurricane Katrina (2005).

A large, stylized yellow number '2' with a white drop shadow, positioned to the left of the Level 2 description box.

Level 2





CDC leaders integral to the Ebola response, including epidemiologists, laboratorians, logistics, and more, assemble in agency's command center to discuss next steps in directing the response at CDC Emergency Operations Center in Atlanta, August 8. Spencer Lowell for TIME magazine

Questions from leadership

How many cases might there be?

When will the epidemic end?

What will it take to end the epidemic?

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

MMWR

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report

Supplement / Vol. 63 / No. 3

September 26, 2014


Estimating the Future Number of Cases in the Ebola Epidemic — Liberia and Sierra Leone, 2014–2015



U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Ebola estimate

Without intervention, the total number of Ebola cases in the West African countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone could top 1 million by January.



SOURCE: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

PATTERSON-CLARK/
THE WASHINGTON POST

Ebola Cases Could Reach 1.4 Million Within Four Months, C.D.C. Estimates

Worst-Case Scenario Can Still Be Avoided

By Anne E. Smith

The number of Ebola cases in West Africa could reach 1.4 million within four months, according to a new report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. But the good news, said the report, is that the worst-case scenario can still be avoided.

In the worst-case scenario, the number of cases could reach a total of 1.4 million by Jan. 25, the report said. But the good news is that the worst-case scenario can still be avoided, said the report. The report said that there are actually 1.1 times as many as reported.

In the best-case scenario, the number of cases would be "reduced" by Jan. 25, the report said. Because the report is based on data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the report is based on data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The report said that the number of cases would be reduced by 1.1 times as many as reported.

The report also said that the number of cases would be reduced by 1.1 times as many as reported. The report said that the number of cases would be reduced by 1.1 times as many as reported.

"We are still in the early stages of the outbreak, and we are going to see a lot of cases in the coming weeks," Dr. Frieden said in a telephone interview. "But it's important to understand that it could happen."

Officials also said that the number of cases would be reduced by 1.1 times as many as reported.

"It's a very big job," said Dr. Frieden, a professor of epidemiology at the University of Florida who has been a leading expert on Ebola in the region.



A Red Cross team removed the body of a woman believed to have died of Ebola in Monrovia, Liberia, last week. Officials urge caution in handling victims' bodies.

are compared with those generated by other models. He said that if some of the best data from the World Health Organization is plugged into the C.D.C. model, "the very large number of estimated cases are, unfortunately, even larger."

The current official case count is 1,412, including 1,200 deaths, according to the W.H.O.

from the C.D.C., but the W.H.O. report also said that there were more deaths than had been reported. The report said that there were more deaths than had been reported.

The W.H.O. report also said that there were more deaths than had been reported.

when those hospitals would be ready, or who would need them.

Dr. Frieden said the Defense Department had already donated parts of a 25-bed unit that would soon be set up in total health workers who become infected, a safety measure he said was important to help encourage health professionals to volunteer. He said that more aid groups

he added. "It even the number of cases could be as high as, say, 100,000 cases by January, the epidemic will quickly overwhelm the capacities that the U.S. plans to meet."

The W.H.O. reported that a new center had just opened in Monrovia, the Liberian capital, with 120 beds for treatment and 10 for surgery. Patients were al-

"Where are they going to go?" he said.

Though providing home-care kits may seem like a pragmatic approach, some public health officials said they were not disappointed for both in isolation or community care.

But Dr. Frieden said that home care had been used to help many outpatients in Africa in the past. The current case count

Job creation/destruction

So, why is it so hard to get traction?


Policymakers don't trust the model(s), they trust the person presenting the model

They don't trust single models, they need ensembles

They're comfortable with statistics but not mechanistic modelling

Multi-model ensembles

IPCC report (AR4)



NTD

MODELLING
CONSORTIUM



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Neglected Tropical Disease Modelling Consortium



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- **9 diseases** incl: schistosomiasis, lymphatic filariasis, trachoma, soil transmitted helminths

2 questions from BMGF

Are we on target for the 2020 goals with current strategies?

If not, what other strategies will be required, and where?



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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/epidemics



Probabilistic forecasts of trachoma transmission at the district level: A statistical model comparison



Amy Pinsent^{a,*}, Fengchen Liu^b, Michael Deiner^{b,c}, Paul Emerson^{c,d}, Ana Bhaktiari^c,
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
Keywords:

Trachoma

Elimination

ABSTRACT

The World Health Organization and its partners are aiming to eliminate trachoma as a public health problem by 2020. In this study, we compare forecasts of TF prevalence in 2011 for 7 different statistical and mechanistic models across 9 de-identified trachoma endemic districts, representing 4 unique trachoma endemic countries. We forecast TF prevalence between 1–6 years ahead in time and compare the 7 different models to the observed 2011 data using a log-likelihood score. An SIS model, including a district-specific random effect for the district-specific transmission coefficient, had the highest log-likelihood score across all 9 districts and was therefore the best performing model. While overall the deterministic transmission model was the least well performing model, although it did compare well to the other





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{ COORDINATING RESEARCH ACTIVITIES IN MATHEMATICAL MODELLING }

HIV Modelling Consortium

The HIV Modelling Consortium aims to help improve scientific support for decision making by co-coordinating a wide range of research activities in mathematically modelling the HIV epidemic.

**Receive
updates from the
HIV Modelling**

Jeffrey W. Eaton^{1,2}, Leigh F. Johnson¹,
Anna Bershteyn⁶, David E. Bloom³,
Salal Humair^{3,11}, Daniel J. Klein⁶,
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Laboratory, Bethesda, Washington, United States of America
4 Medical Research Council Centre for Outbreak Analysis &
5 Epidemiology, Rotterdam, Netherlands, 6 Donders
7 Institute of Science and Engineering, Leiden University
8 Future Institute, Gloucestershire, Connecticut, United States

Background: Many mathematical models on new HIV infections. Comparing results slightly different questions and have in mathematical models simulating the same about the epidemiological impact of ex

Methods and Findings: Twelve independent scenarios in South Africa and reported a threshold for treatment eligibility, access individuals start treatment on average 1.3 y, the models projected that HIV incidence counterfactual scenario in which there incidence. The impact of optimistic inter-substantial uncertainty about the theoretical four decades. The number of

[illegible]

Background: New WHO guidelines recommend initiation of antiretroviral therapy for HIV-positive adults with CD4 counts of 500 cells per μL or less, a higher threshold than was previously recommended. Country decision makers have to decide whether to further expand eligibility for antiretroviral therapy accordingly. We aimed to assess the potential health benefits, costs, and cost-effectiveness of various eligibility criteria for adult antiretroviral therapy and expanded treatment coverage.

Methods: We used several independent mathematical models in four settings—South Africa (generalised epidemic, moderate antiretroviral therapy coverage), Zambia (generalised epidemic, high antiretroviral therapy coverage), India (concentrated epidemic, moderate antiretroviral therapy coverage), and Vietnam (concentrated epidemic, low antiretroviral therapy coverage)—to assess the potential health benefits, costs, and cost-effectiveness of various eligibility criteria for adult antiretroviral therapy under scenarios of existing and expanded treatment coverage, with results projected over 20 years. Analyses assessed the extension of eligibility to include individuals with CD4 counts of 500 cells per µl, or less, or all HIV-positive adults, compared with the previous (WHO) recommendation of initiation with CD4 counts of 350 cells per µl or less. We assessed costs from a health-system perspective, and calculated the incremental cost (in US\$) per disability-adjusted life-year (DALY) averted to compare competing strategies. Strategies were regarded very cost-effective if the cost per DALY averted was less than the country's 2012 per-head gross domestic product (GDP; South Africa: \$8048; Zambia: \$1621; India: \$1435; Vietnam: \$1087) and cost-effective if the cost per DALY averted was less than three times the per-head GDP.

Findings In South Africa, the cost per DAAT averted of extending eligibility for antiretroviral therapy to adult patients with CD4 counts of 300 cells per µl, or less (range) from £257 to £600 per DAAT averted compared with 2040 guidelines. In Zambia, expansion of eligibility to adults with a CD4 count threshold of 300 cells per µl, ranged from lessening health outcomes while reducing costs (ie, dominating the previous guidelines) to \$749 per DAAT averted. In both countries results were similar for expansion of eligibility to all HIV-positive adults, and where substantially expanded treatment coverage was assumed. Expansion of treatment coverage to the poorest populations was also cost-effective.

Keywords: *gender inequality, gender discrimination, gender equity, gender equality, gender justice, gender equity, gender equality, gender justice*

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1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

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Health Insurance Strategies

Abstract

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Suppression of Tumor Growth

2000



TB diagnosis

The practical process of preparing sputum samples for TB diagnosis.



Mission Statement

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
Improved training to data

The transmission dynamics of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)

BY R. M. MAY,¹ F.R.S., AND R. M. ANDERSON,² F.R.S.

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Epidemiology, transmission dynamics and control of SARS: the 2002–2003 epidemic

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Steven Riley¹, Neil M. Ferguson¹, Gabriel M. Leung², T. H. Lam²
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


Figure 12. The SARS epidemic in Hong Kong and the fit of a multi-compartment meta-population stochastic model (from Riley *et al.* 2003). The dots are reported SARS cases and the solid line is the best fit model. The vertical grey bars denote 95% prediction intervals.

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa — The First 9 Months of the Epidemic and Forward Projections

WHO Ebola Response Team*




ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND

On March 23, 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) was notified of an outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Guinea. On August 8, the WHO declared the epidemic to be a “public health emergency of international concern.”

METHODS

By September 14, 2014, a total of 4507 probable and confirmed cases, including 2296 deaths from EVD (Zaire species) had been reported from five countries in West Africa — Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. We analyzed a detailed subset of data on 3343 confirmed and 667 probable Ebola cases collected in Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone as of September 14.

A Guinea**B Liberia****C Sierra Leone****Figure 4. Observed and Projected Case Incidence.**

Observed and projected weekly case incidence in Guinea (Panel A), Liberia (Panel B), and Sierra Leone (Panel C) are shown on linear (upper panels) and logarithmic (lower panels) scales.




Figure 1. Case Reproduction Numbers and Weekly Incidence in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

Shown are the estimated case reproduction number (R_t) over time (upper panels) and the observed and projected weekly incidence (lower panels) of confirmed and probable cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD), according to the date of symptom onset, from the week beginning June 30, 2014, until the week beginning January 12, 2015, on the basis of data reported through December 7 for Guinea and November 30 for Liberia and Sierra Leone. The projections shown in the lower panels were generated from R_t estimates derived from data on case incidence (daily situation reports) for the 7 weeks through December 7 for Guinea and November 30 for Liberia and Sierra Leone (the time period delineated by the vertical dotted lines).

Epidemic Prediction Initiative **BETA**

Moving forecasting from research to decisions.

EPI aims to improve the science and usability of epidemic forecasts by facilitating open forecasting projects with specific public health objectives. Links to current and past projects can be found below. Learn more about EPI [here](#).

CURRENT PROJECTS

State FluSight 2017-18

Seasonal Influenza Forecasting at the US State Level

FluSight 2017-18


Seasonal Influenza Forecasting

Influenza Hospitalizations 2017-18

Forecasting laboratory confirmed influenza hospitalizations

CDC FluSight Network

Collaborative Ensemble



Prof Nicholas Reich: <http://flusightnetwork.io>

Automation

So, what does a mathematical epidemiologist do?

- ✓ Devises (and performs) data collection
- ✓ Cleans the data
- ✓ Selects appropriate mathematical models
- ✓ Trains those models on the data
- ✓ Forecasts/Nowcasts/Scenario Analyses
- ✓ Communicates results to leadership

Which of these can be automated?

- ✓ Devises (and performs) data collection
- ✓ Cleans the data
- ✓ Selects appropriate mathematical models
- ✓ Trains those models on the data
- ✓ Forecasts/Nowcasts/Scenario Analyses
- ✓ Communicates results to leadership

However, things are changing

- ✓ New data types
- ✓ New mathematical models
- ✓ New training methods
- ✓ New visualisation of data/results

So, the AI epidemiologist would need to be upgraded frequently

In addition...

- Open sourcing code and data (when possible): reproducibility
- Breakthrough in model training needed
- ML methods are flexible to adding in new data types
- ML models can be reusable: 'transfer learning'

Let's get started,
Select a project or create a new one

Dengue
Fever

Zika
Virus

Measles

Dragon
Pox

Malaria



Suggesting Sources For: Influenza, United States, Atlanta, Georgia



TAGS

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travel trends

outbreaks

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travel trends

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Suggested Literature

NEW RESULTS

- 24 Journals
- 33 News Articles
- 37 Academic Reports

Overall Themes

- Increased travel patterns
- Global panic
- Comparison to H1N1 outbreak
- Outbreak prediction

Most Common Keywords

- Pandemic
- Influenza
- Transmission
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Influenza Projection 2017

By Author Name

Source

"Unexpectedly, the first pandemic of the 21st century was caused by a novel H1N1 influenza virus, derived by reassortment of two preexisting..."

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Flu Spread by Air Travel

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"Unexpectedly, the first pandemic of the 21st century was caused by a novel H1N1 influenza virus, derived by reassortment of two preexisting..."

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Global Flu Outbreaks

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Influenza Outbreak

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Source

"Unexpectedly, the first pandemic of the 21st century was caused by a novel H1N1 influenza virus, derived by reassortment of two preexisting..."

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Swine Flu Twitter Trends

By Author Name

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"Unexpectedly, the first pandemic of the 21st century was caused by a novel H1N1 influenza virus, derived by reassortment of two preexisting..."

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Stopping the Outbreak...

By Author Name

Source

"Unexpectedly, the first pandemic of the 21st century was caused by a novel H1N1 influenza virus, derived by reassortment of two preexisting..."

4.0 Rating

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Workspace

$$CT_k = \frac{\sum_{t=1, t \neq T, t \leq K-6} (h(T+k) - F(t) + h(t))^2}{\sum_{t=1, t \neq T, t \leq K-6} (h(T+k) - I)^2}$$

Change

Click variable to change

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Enter new value

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
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Whooping Cough Epidemic

By JESSE MANNLEY
Published: June 23, 2012

SAN FRANCISCO — Health authorities in the state on Wednesday announced a new background — to go

The announcement reports of pertussis often is mistaken for told, 910 cases have been under investigation largest in the state

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Whooping-cough booster may soon be added The CDC advisory panel, however, rejected adding chicken pox, a setback for vaccine-maker Merck.

July 1, 2005

Chemical In Child Vaccines Stirs Debate

July 3, 1999

Web Site Makes Case For Vaccines Children's Hospital Of Phila. Aims To Ease Fears About The Growing Number Of Shots Required.

October 16, 2000

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Cases of whooping cough in United States highest since 1959

December 12, 2012 | By Don Sapatkin, Inquirer Staff Writer

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With pertussis at its highest level nationally in a half-century, the Philadelphia region has been weathering a spike that in some places is more than triple the previous record set two years ago.

"We're sort of way off the scale this year," said Stephen Ostroff, Pennsylvania's acting physician general. "It really started picking up in the summer, and once kids got back to school, the [pertussis] was already there."

Cases of pertussis, also known as whooping cough, often decline in late fall into early winter. In Philadelphia, which recorded 50 cases for August — more typical of an entire year — infections plummeted last month. But there has been no major decrease statewide, Ostroff said.

Story continues below.

How worried should we be about the whooping cough epidemic?

MARY-ROSE MACCOLL The Australian April 26, 2012 12:00AM



Newborn babies are most at risk of death from the disease.

Babies are offered a whooping cough vaccine at two, three and four months of age.

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
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-  In harmony
Did this woman change history with one song?

Reported pertussis cases – 1922-2010



SOURCE: CDC, National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System and Supplemental Pertussis Surveillance System and 1922-1949, passive reports to the Public Health Service

Questions from leadership

Is the effectiveness and duration of protection of the new vaccine different to the old?




Table 1. Descriptions of the nested models that were fitted to the NNDSS incidence data.


Model	Description	DIC
1	Protection duration of whole cell vaccine same as natural infection; acellular vaccine same as whole-cell	-8720
2	Protection duration of whole cell vaccine same as natural infection; different efficacy for acellular vaccine	-9570
3	Protection duration of whole cell vaccine same as natural infection; different protection duration for acellular vaccine;	-9250
4	Protection duration of whole cell vaccine different from natural infection; acellular vaccine same as whole-cell	-9800
5	Protection duration of whole cell vaccine same as natural infection; protection duration and efficacy different for acellular vaccine	-8422
6	Whole cell vaccine protection duration different from natural infection; different efficacy for acellular vaccine	-9183
7	Whole cell vaccine protection duration different from natural infection; different protection duration for acellular vaccine	-9230
8	Whole cell vaccine protection duration different from natural infection; protection duration and efficacy different for acellular vaccine	-8417
The mean posterior values of the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) of the models are given in the rightmost column.		
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004138.t001		

Gambhir M, Clark TA, Cauchemez S, Tartof SY, Swerdlow DL, et al. (2015) A Change in Vaccine Efficacy and Duration of Protection Explains Recent Rises in Pertussis Incidence in the United States. PLoS Comput Biol 11(4): e1004138.


doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004138

<http://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004138>


Total incidence since vaccination began: model vs. data




Projecting forward in time




$VE * coverage = 10\%$




40%



70%



90%





RESEARCH ARTICLE


A Change in Vaccine Efficacy and Duration of Protection Explains Recent Rises in Pertussis Incidence in the United States

Manoj Gambhir^{1,2,3*}, Thomas A. Clark⁴, Simon Cauchemez^{5,6}, Sara Y. Tartof⁷, David L. Swerdlow^{2,8}, Neil M. Ferguson⁸

1 Department of Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, **2** Modeling Unit, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America, **3** IHRC, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America, **4** Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, NCIRD, CDC, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America, **5** Medical Research Council Centre for Outbreak Analysis and Modelling, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom, **6** Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Diseases Unit, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France, **7** Kaiser Permanente Southern California, Kaiser Permanente Research, Department of Research & Evaluation, Pasadena, California, United States of America, **8** Office of Science and Integrative Programs, NCIRD, CDC, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America

* manoj.gambhir@monash.edu





Gambhir M, Clark TA, Cauchemez S, Tartof SY, Swerdlow DL, et al. (2015) A Change in Vaccine Efficacy and Duration of Protection Explains Recent Rises in Pertussis Incidence in the United States. *PLoS Comput Biol* 11(4): e1004138.

doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004138

<http://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004138>

Projects throughout CDC

Pertussis Explaining the recent
upsurge in cases in 7-10 yos and rise
in overall cases

Ebola 2014-2015 West African
epidemic



Lessons

Modelling's major contribution comes very early
(when sit. awareness is poor)

Embed within a public health agency

Academic publication often isn't useful during an
emergency (but is afterward)

Thank you for your time!

Special thanks to:

David Swerdlow

Lyn Finelli

Carrie Reed

Matt Biggerstaff

Cristina Carias

Martin Meltzer

Rebekah Borse

Isaac Fung

Neil Ferguson

Simon Cauchemez

Christl Donnelly

Tom Clark

Ben Lopman

Amy Pinsent

+ many others




Figure: Temporal trends on Twitter and Google about Ebola and influenza (flu) before, during, and after Ebola cases in the USA, September to November, 2014

*Numbers are relative to the highest number of searches done on Google (for Ebola on Oct 16).


1-10 11-50 51-100 101-250 251-500 501+



March 2014



April 2014




Gueckedou: —
Origin of outbreak


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
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


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



District data for July 2014 not available

December 2014




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Liberia_

— Patient database — Situation report



Sierra Leone

Patient database Situation report




Guinea


— Patient database — Situation report




A All Countries Combined




B Guinea



C Liberia



D Sierra Leone






Table 2. Parameter estimates for the best-fitting model, Model 8 (models outlined in Table 1).

Parameter description	Value
Vaccine efficacies & waning	
Whole-cell	
Vaccine efficacy of 1 st 3 doses/4 th /5 th dose	90% [87%, 94%]
Rate of loss of whole-cell vaccine immunity	$3 \times 10^{-5} \text{yr}^{-1}$ [2×10^{-6} , 2×10^{-4}] i.e. essentially lifelong
Acellular	
Vaccine efficacy of 1 st 3 doses/4 th /5 th dose	80% [78%, 82%]
Rate of loss of acellular vaccine immunity	0.018yr^{-1} [0.015, 0.020] i.e. average of approx. 50 yrs protection
Tdap	
Vaccine efficacy	As acellular
Epidemiological Parameters	
Basic reproduction number, R_0	11.0 [9.9, 11.5]
Rate of loss of natural immunity	$3 \times 10^{-5} \text{yr}^{-1}$ [2×10^{-6} , 2×10^{-4}] i.e. essentially lifelong (as for whole-cell)
Relative susceptibility of individuals to subsequent infection (with reference to naive individuals)	32% [29%, 35%]
Relative infectiousness of individuals with subsequent infection (with reference to primary-infected individuals)	17% [14%, 23%]
Year of reporting rate change	None
Mean reporting rate prior to change	6.0% [0.1%, 22%]
Mean reporting rate after change	n/a


doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004138.t002

Gambhir M, Clark TA, Cauchemez S, Tartof SY, Swerdlow DL, et al. (2015) A Change in Vaccine Efficacy and Duration of Protection Explains Recent Rises in Pertussis Incidence in the United States. PLoS Comput Biol 11(4): e1004138.

doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004138

<http://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004138>

Fig 3. Cross-sectional incidence of disease over age of population.



Gambhir M, Clark TA, Cauchemez S, Tartof SY, Swerdlow DL, et al. (2015) A Change in Vaccine Efficacy and Duration of Protection Explains Recent Rises in Pertussis Incidence in the United States. *PLoS Comput Biol* 11(4): e1004138.

doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004138

<http://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004138>

CDC's overblown estimate of Ebola outbreak draws criticism

Originally published August 1, 2015 at 2:24 pm | Updated August 1, 2015 at 5:51 pm



Martin Meltzer, standing in the Emergency Operations Center at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, is a disease modeler for the agency. (David Goldman/AP)

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Google

Disease modelers use math to try to provide a more precise picture of a certain situation or to predict how the situation will change, and have become critical in the world of infectious diseases. But the accuracy — or inaccuracy — of such models is increasingly a talking point.



Model equations

$$\frac{dS}{dt}$$

Susceptible

$$\frac{dI}{dt}$$

Infected

$$\frac{dR}{dt}$$

Recovered

Inflow & outflow

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \boxed{} - \boxed{\beta S \cdot I}$$


Susceptible

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \boxed{\beta S \cdot I} - \boxed{\frac{1}{d} \cdot I}$$

Infected

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \boxed{\frac{1}{d} \cdot I} - \boxed{}$$

Recovered



As infecteds increase, *rate* increases

Assessing the International Spreading Risk Associated with the 2014 West African Ebola Outbreak

SEPTEMBER 2, 2014 - RESEARCH



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■ REVISIONS

This article is either a revised version or has previous revisions

Edition 1 - September 2, 2014 ▼

■ AUTHORS


Marcelo F. C. Gomes · Ana Pastore y Piontti · Luca Rossi · Dennis Chao · Ira Longini · M. Elizabeth Halloran · Alessandro Vespignani

■ ABSTRACT

Background: The 2014 West African Ebola Outbreak is so far the largest and deadliest recorded in history. The affected countries, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, and Nigeria, have been struggling to contain and to mitigate the outbreak. The ongoing rise in confirmed and suspected cases, 2615 as of 20 August 2014, is considered to increase the risk of international dissemination, especially because the epidemic is now affecting cities with major commercial airports.

Method: We use the Global Epidemic and Mobility Model to generate stochastic, individual based simulation





Copy of Ebola Response_v5_Sierra Leone_EbolaResponse_MANO - Excel

Gambhir, Manoj (CDC/OED/NCRPD) (CTR)

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**CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(CDC)**

Sierra Leone EbolaResponse (ER)
Modeling the spread of disease impact & intervention
Version 3.0


Contributors: Michael Washington, Charisma Atkins, Martin Meltzer

Division of Preparedness & Emerging Infections
Health Economics & Modeling Unit (HEMU)
December 4, 2014

Ebolareponse (modeling tool th Excel Macros (Le higher). It is not machines that ut as Linux. When security warning "enable content" you must enable appropriate step 1. Click the "Ena located at the to

Title Intro Population Incubation Transmission Sierra Leone_uncorrected


BEACH



Questions from leadership

What's a viable vaccine trial design during the outbreak?

Stepped wedge study design - 18 week phase-in of vaccination



type of person-time	proportions
unvaccinated	0.50
vaccinated, seroconverting	n/a
vaccinated, seroconverted	0.50

Bolded square highlights follow-up time usable for efficacy analyses, excluding 21 day sero-conversion time. Usable follow-up weeks contain both unvaccinated and vaccinated cohort time.


Example Vaccination Groups: (1) facility HCW such as doctors, nurses, phlebotomists (2) facility support such as cooking and food delivery, housekeeping, sanitation (3) ambulance teams (4) burial teams. Each of 3 shifts is treated as a different Vaccination Group. Vaccination Groups and shifts are distributed evenly across Vaccination Weeks, with a vaccination weeks assigned at random.

Specific questions

Will an e.g. Cox Proportional Hazards approach be able to account for:

- Declining background disease risk
- Clustering of disease risk
- Healthy vaccinee effect

Example simulation (single model run):



Unvaccinated: 43 cases
0.81 cases/person-month

Vaccinated: 27 cases
0.51 cases/person-month


No cases included until first
vaccinee reaches end of
seroconversion period

Longer lag to accrue
vaccinated cases

Hazard ratio:
0.55 (0.32 – 0.96)
Vaccine Efficacy:
45% (4% -68%)

No bias: Predicted VE

1000 runs at each VE input (range 50% to 90%)



Statistical power and validity of Ebola vaccine trials in Sierra Leone: a simulation study of trial design and analysis



Steven E Bellan, Juliet R C Pulliam, Carl A B Pearson, David Champredon, Spencer J Fox, Laura Skrip, Alison P Galvani, Manoj Gambhir, Ben A Lopman, Travis C Porco, Lauren Ancel Meyers, Jonathan Dushoff

Summary

Background Safe and effective vaccines could help to end the ongoing Ebola virus disease epidemic in parts of west Africa, and mitigate future outbreaks of the virus. We assess the statistical validity and power of randomised controlled trial (RCT) and stepped-wedge cluster trial (SWCT) designs in Sierra Leone, where the incidence of Ebola virus disease is spatiotemporally heterogeneous, and is decreasing rapidly.

Methods We projected district-level Ebola virus disease incidence for the next 6 months, using a stochastic model fitted to data from Sierra Leone. We then simulated RCT and SWCT designs in trial populations comprising geographically distinct clusters at high risk, taking into account realistic logistical constraints, and both individual-level and cluster-level variations in risk. We assessed false-positive rates and power for parametric and non-parametric analyses of simulated trial data, across a range of vaccine efficacies and trial start dates.

Findings For an SWCT, regional variation in Ebola virus disease incidence trends produced increased false-positive rates (up to 0.15 at $\alpha=0.05$) under standard statistical models, but not when analysed by a permutation test, whereas analyses of RCTs remained statistically valid under all models. With the assumption of a 6-month trial starting on Feb 18, 2015, we estimate the power to detect a 90% effective vaccine to be between 49% and 89% for an RCT, and between 6% and 26% for an SWCT, depending on the Ebola virus disease incidence within the trial population. We estimate that a 1-month delay in trial initiation will reduce the power of the RCT by 20% and that of the SWCT by 49%.

Interpretation Spatiotemporal variation in infection risk undermines the statistical power of the SWCT. This variation also undercuts the SWCT's expected ethical advantages over the RCT, because an RCT, but not an SWCT, can prioritise vaccination of high-risk clusters.

Lancet Infect Dis 2015

Published Online

April 15, 2015

[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099\(15\)70139-8](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(15)70139-8)

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Center for Computational Biology and Bioinformatics

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Prof L A Meyers PhD), The

University of Texas at Austin,

Austin, TX, USA; Department

of Biology (J R C Pulliam PhD)

and Emerging Pathogens

Institute (J R C Pulliam,

C A B Pearson PhD), University

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School of Computational





Science and Engineering


(D Champredon MSc) and

Department of Biology

(J Dushoff PhD), McMaster

University, Hamilton, ON





Questions from leadership

Where should ETUs be constructed next?

Which neighboring countries are at the highest risk?



Can we learn from the business/start-up world too?

Research: do it once

Development: can it be done many times?

Product/Service: do it many, many times