“The adoption of the treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons was a landmark achievement, but there are no indicators that any current states in possession of nuclear weapons intend to relinquish their stockpiles. 

“Indeed, we've started to see rhetoric from non-nuclear states suggesting that rearmament should be on the agenda.  In this fraught environment, the need to set guardrails is paramount, and a Code of Conduct on Nuclear Command, Control and Communication is a necessary addition to the regulatory landscape.”

NC3 frameworks are designed to prevent accidental or unlawful launches, but the paper warns they are increasingly under strain. In many countries, NC3 infrastructure is ageing, with some hardware dating back decades. These legacy systems are often ill-equipped to manage modern threats, particularly those posed by cyberattacks or artificial intelligence.

In 2025 alone, the world has witnessed a sharp rise in geopolitical instability, increased nuclear posturing in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and South Asia, and revelations of AI-assisted decision-making tools being tested by military actors. Analysts have also raised concerns about growing disinformation and hacking campaigns targeting early warning systems.

“In a world where AI tools can mimic official communications and cyber incursions can scramble critical infrastructure, the possibility of a false alarm triggering an escalation is no longer far-fetched,” the paper notes.

In such a high-stakes environment, even a single NC3 failure – whether due to human error, faulty software, or a spoofed alert – could have catastrophic consequences.

In response to these growing risks, the paper calls for the international community to adopt a nonbinding Code of Conduct on Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications. Drawing inspiration from the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), this proposed code would serve as a soft-law framework to guide best practice, increase transparency, and encourage restraint among nuclear-armed states.

Unlike a treaty, which requires long negotiations and formal ratification, a nonbinding code could be adopted more quickly – providing an immediate framework for cooperation and accountability.

“This is not about disarmament – it’s about crisis prevention,” said Professor Crawford. 

“Establishing shared principles for NC3 systems can help reduce misunderstandings, limit the spread of dangerous technologies, and avoid accidental escalation.”

The paper provides a detailed legal analysis of how NC3 systems interact with existing international law including the laws of armed conflict, the law of neutrality, and environmental protections. It makes the case that nuclear operations must be held to the same standards as conventional military conduct, and that NC3 design should reflect these obligations.

In doing so, the research bridges the gap between legal doctrine and practical policy. It argues a code of conduct would not only improve legal compliance but also enhance the overall safety and stability of the international security landscape.

With global trust in arms control regimes at a low ebb and new technologies outpacing existing governance, the paper offers a rare note of clarity and constructive direction. It provides a roadmap for meaningful progress at a time when many institutions are paralysed by gridlock or geopolitical rivalry.

“If the world waits for a catastrophic NC3 failure to occur before acting,” the paper warns, “it will be too late.”

DECLARATION

The paper was funded by the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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